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Sayedzada v. State, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 38 (May 24, 2018)1 
 




 The Court held that a party waives the right challenge a juror’s presence on appeal when 
the argument is based on facts known during voir dire; the party consciously made the decision to 
not pursue, or abandoned, a challenge for cause; and the party accepted the juror’s presence on the 
jury. The Court then examined the issue of juror bias, and explained the differences between actual, 




 Sayedbashe Sayedzada (“Sayedzada”) was confronted by a security guard who noticed that 
he was hiding something under his shirt. Sayedzada subsequently attacked the guard, which 
prompted the guard to bring Sayedzada under control and call the police. It was discovered that 
Sayedzada had a purse, which he claimed to have found, hung around his neck. In total, thirteen 
credit cards were recovered from inside the purse, as well as scattered on the ground, that belonged 
to a woman and her family members. Police then contacted the purse’s owner who advised that 
she did not know that her purse had been stolen from her vehicle. Accordingly, the State charged 
Sayedzada with thirteen counts of possession of a credit card or debit card without the cardholder’s 
consent, to which he entered a plea of not guilty. 
 During voir dire, Sayedzada challenged prospective jurors 7, 29, 37, and 38 for cause. Prior 
to making its ruling, the district court allowed a traverse of the challenged jurors. Following each 
side’s questioning of the prospective jurors, Sayedzada renewed his challenges to prospective 
jurors 29 and 38, but he did not make any further challenges as to prospective jurors 7 and 37. The 
district court denied Sayedzada’s two challenges for cause without explanation so Sayedzada used 
his peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors 29 and 38, however, prospective jurors 7 
and 37 were empaneled without further objection. Following the trial, the jury convicted 




 Sayedzada argued his trial was prejudiced and warranted reversal because prospective 
jurors 7 and 37 were empaneled after the district court denied his challenges for cause, and he also 
argued that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his challenges for cause regarding 
prospective jurors 29 and 38. 
 
Waiver of right to challenge jurors 7 and 37 on appeal 
 
 Sayedzada contended that the jury was not fair and impartial because it included 
prospective jurors 7 and 37, who he had objected to for cause. He claimed that the jurors were 
biased as evidenced by their answers elicited during voir dire. Though Sayedzada conceded that 
he failed to renew his challenges to these jurors after they were traversed as to bias, he argued that 
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this was irrelevant. He cited Blake v. State, which he interpreted to require the Court to reverse the 
verdict if any biased juror is empaneled regardless of whether the party challenged the juror for 
cause.2 
 The Court found Sayedzada’s argument to be misplaced because his interpretation of Blake 
was too broad. The Court in Blake held that regardless of whether the district court abused its 
discretion, the error was not reversible where the defendant did not show, “that any juror actually 
empaneled was unfair or biased.”3 The appellant in Blake preserved his argument for appeal by 
challenging the juror below.4 Therefore, Blake is in accordance with the general rule in Nevada 
that states that if the empaneled jury is impartial, then erroneously failing to strike a juror for cause 
is not a reversible error.5 
 Accordingly, the issue before the Court was whether a defendant may waive subsequent 
challenges to the seating of a juror if the record indicates that the defendant was aware of particular 
facts below, the defendant consciously did not pursue, or abandoned, a challenge for cause based 
on such facts, and the defendant accepted the fact that the juror was empaneled on the jury. Under 
these circumstances the Court held that a defendant waives the right to challenge the seating of the 
juror.6 The Court has cited and recognized both State v. Anderson and State v. Hartley when 
considering whether a defendant can waive the right to raise a challenge to juror bias on appeal. 
 In Anderson, a juror stated during voir dire that, “he had formed and expressed an 
unqualified opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, but subsequently had modified that 
opinion.”7 Defense did not challenge the juror for bias below.8 When Anderson subsequently 
appealed, the Court concluded that he could not raise this objection because if a defendant accepts 
a juror without objection, even if the defendant knows that the prospective juror has formed and 
expressed an unqualified opinion, then he cannot raise this objection after the verdict.9 
 In Hartley, several jurors stated during voir dire that they had formed, “an unqualified 
opinion as to the guilt or innocence of [Hartley].”10 On appeal, Hartley argued that even though he 
did not object to these jurors, they should have been disqualified.11 The Court looked to both the 
common law as well as the statute, and determined that a party could waive an objection to a juror 
if the reason for the challenge was known at the time, and that a party did waive it unless the 
challenge was taken prior to the jury being empaneled.12 Additionally, the Court stated under such 
circumstances, the defendant cannot argue that he has not been tried by a “constitutional jury” 
following the jury’s verdict.13 
 Most recently, the Court addressed the issue of waiver in McCall v. State, where defense 
counsel was alerted to the fact that a juror was a citizen of British Columbia from her juror 
                                                 
2  Blake v. State, 121 Nev. 779, 796, 121 P.3d 567, 578 (2005). 
3  Id. 
4  Id. at 795–96. 
5  See, e.g., Preciado v. State, 130 Nev. 40, 44 (2014); Weber v. State, 121 Nev. 554, 581 (2005); Farmer v. State, 
405 P.3d 114 (2017). 
6  See McCall v. State, 97 Nev. 514, 516 (1981); State v. Hartley, 22 Nev. 342, 357 (1895); State v. Anderson, 4 
Nev. 265, 279 (1868). 
7  Anderson, 4 Nev. at 279. 
8  Id. 
9  Id. 
10  Hartley, 22 Nev. at 354. 
11  Id. at 354–55. 
12  Id. at 355–56. 
13  Id. at 357. 
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questionnaire.14 Though there was no objection at the time of voir dire, the defendant moved for a 
mistrial when he discovered that the juror was not an American citizen.15 However, the Court 
found that the defendant waived his right to challenge this claim when he failed to object during 
voir dire.16 
 The Court found that the underlying policy of the waiver rule is sound because it prevents 
parties from strategically placing questionable jurors on the jury in order to lay the foundation for 
reversal in the event of an unfavorable verdict. The Court reiterated that a party waives the right 
challenge a juror’s presence on appeal when the argument is based on facts known during voir 
dire; the party consciously made the decision to not pursue, or abandoned, a challenge for cause; 
and the party accepted the juror’s presence on the jury. In order for the waiver rule to apply, the 
record must clearly show that the party was aware of the applicable facts and consciously made 
the decision to approve the juror, and when the record does not show this, then a challenge to the 
seating of a juror may be reviewed for plain error. 
 Here, Sayedzada knew during voir dire about the facts that he argued demonstrated that 
jurors 7 and 37 were biased, which is evidenced by the fact that he had initially attempted to 
challenge those jurors for cause. However, following the traverse of the jurors, he did not to renew 
his challenges. Sayedzada also bypassed additional opportunities to challenge the jurors on the 
facts that he raised on appeal. The first opportunity was when he reasserted his challenge for cause 
following the traverse of prospective jurors 29 and 38, and the second was when he asserted that 
he did not have any challenges after the district court explicitly asked if either party had any further 
challenges. Following these two instances, Sayedzada accepted the jury panel. Thus, Sayedzada 
relinquished his objections to these jurors, and accepted their presence on the jury. The Court 
concluded that Sayedzada waived his right to make an appellate argument regarding the jurors’ 
bias, and that he had not been denied a fair and impartial jury due to the presence of these jurors. 
 
For-cause challenges to prospective jurors 29 and 38 
 
 Sayedzada argued that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his for-cause 
challenges for jurors 29 and 38. He claimed that both jurors were biased because each had 
experienced events similar to that of the victim. 
 A party may challenge a prospective juror for any cause that would prevent the juror from 
considering the facts fairly.17 The trial judge determines whether the juror is qualified. 
Accordingly, the Court gives deference to the trial court’s decision. When the Court is reviewing 
whether the juror demonstrated bias it must consider the juror’s cumulative statements. The Court 
has repeatedly held that district courts must strike for cause any juror who, during voir dire, 
demonstrates that his or her views would prevent or impair him or her from being impartial and 
applying the law. Even when the juror promises impartiality, bias may still arise from the juror’s 
background or experiences. In United States v. Torres, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
defined three types of bias, actual, implied, and inferable, as grounds for dismissing a juror for 
cause.18 
                                                 
14  McCall, 97 Nev. at 515–16. 
15  Id. at 516. 
16  Id. 
17  NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.036(1) (2015). 
18  United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43–48 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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 Actual bias is when a juror demonstrates a state of mind that prevents the juror from being 
impartial, such as when the juror admits to partiality or the juror’s voir dire answers indicate bias.19 
It is determined through adequate questioning by the court regarding the juror’s ability to apply 
the law impartially.20 The court has broad discretion in determining whether a juror’s answers 
indicate actual bias. 
 Implied bias is when the juror’s background and/or the juror’s relationship to the parties or 
case may indicate bias.21 It is independent of actual bias.22 Under common law, implied bias exists 
only in nine specific circumstances,23 and the Nevada Legislature has codified elements of implied 
bias in the civil context.24 However, the Legislature has not codified what constitutes implied bias 
in the criminal context. Since the facts in this case did not rise to the level of implied bias, the 
Court did not define it here. 
 Inferable bias arises when a juror discloses a fact that indicates that he or she is at risk of 
partiality.25 It must be sufficient enough to grant the trial judge discretion to excuse the juror for 
cause, but not rise to the level of a mandatory presumption of bias.26 Inferable bias is similar to 
actual bias in that it arises from facts uncovered during voir dire, but it is different in that it does 
not rely on the juror to admit bias or require the judge to evaluate the juror’s credibility.27 It is 
similar to implied bias in that it does not rely on the juror’s assertion of impartiality, but it is 
distinct in that the facts that are disclosed do not require the juror’s excusal for cause.28 Mandatory 
disqualification arises when a juror is actually or impliedly biased, however inferable bias allows 
a judge to exercise his or her discretion to determine whether the facts indicate that the juror would 
be unable to consider the case objectively.29 
 
 Prospective juror 29 
 
 Prospective juror 29 made statements during voir dire that troubled the Court. She stated 
that she had been the victim of credit card theft on several occasions, and that she was the victim 
of a vehicle burglary where her purse and valuables were stolen. Additionally, she expressed 
multiple times that she did not think she could be impartial in this case due to her own experiences. 
Prospective juror 29 claimed after further questioning that her experiences did not affect her view 
of the criminal justice system. She then stated that she was able to be fair and impartial. However, 
she backtracked these statements. Prospective juror 29 also advised that she believed a truly 
innocent defendant would want to personally state his or her case, and that a criminal defense 
attorney’s job is to get his or her client out of trouble. 
 The Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by denying Sayedzada’s 
for-cause challenge for prospective juror 29 because the facts show that she demonstrated actual 
bias. Prospective juror 29 explicitly and repeatedly stated that she did not believe she could be 
                                                 
19  Id. at 43–44. 
20  Id. at 44. 
21  Id. at 45. 
22  Id. 
23  NEV. GEN. STAT. § 4220 (1861). 
24  NEV. REV. STAT. § 16.050 (2015). 
25  Torres, 128 F.3d at 47. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
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impartial. She also belittled Sayedzada’s constitutional right not to testify, as well as the defense 
attorney’s role in the case. Further, she did not offer any statements that countered her previous 
assertions. Thus, prospective juror 29’s statements as a whole indicated that her bias would have 
prevented or substantially impaired her ability to apply the law and the district court’s instructions. 
 The Court determined that even if there was no actual bias, these facts would have 
supported a determination and subsequent dismissal due to inferable bias. Prospective juror 29 
also indicated that these experiences made her angry, and that her experiences could influence her 
views towards the defendant. This showed that she was unable to separate her personal experiences 
from the case. Therefore, because an average person in prospective juror 29’s position would not 
be able to decide the matter objectively, the district court would have been within its discretion to 
infer bias and strike prospective juror 29. 
 The Court held that even though the district court should have granted the challenge for 
cause, its error in denying the challenge did not immediately constitute grounds for reversal 
because the defendant must still demonstrate that he exhausted all of his peremptory challenges 
and that the empaneled jury was unfair or biased. The Court concluded that the error was harmless 
because Sayedzada removed both prospective jurors 29 and 38 by peremptory challenge. Further, 
since the Court found that Sayedzada waived his arguments that jurors 7 and 37 were biased, and 
there are no other empaneled jurors that he argued were biased, then there was nothing to indicate 
that the jury was not fair and impartial. The Court concluded that no relief was warranted. 
 
 Prospective juror 38 
 
 The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
Sayedzada’s for-cause challenge to prospective juror 38 because she did not express more than a 
possibility of bias arising from her experiences. Prospective juror 38 stated that she did not believe 
her experiences would affect her ability to be fair and impartial. Though, her bank account and 
credit card information had been stolen, these experiences were different from the victim’s 
experiences in this case. Thus, the record did not indicate that prospective juror 38 was biased in 




 The district court must dismiss biased jurors for cause in order to ensure that a defendant 
has a fair and impartial jury. However, a party waives the right to challenge a juror’s presence on 
appeal when the argument is based on facts known during voir dire; the party consciously made 
the decision to not pursue, or abandoned, a challenge for cause; and the party accepted the juror’s 
presence on the jury. Here, the Court concluded that Sayedzada waived his challenges for jurors 7 
and 37. 
 The district court must excuse a juror for cause for actual and implied bias, and may excuse 
a juror for inferable bias. Failure to excuse a biased prospective juror rises to a reversible error 
only if there is an erroneous denial of the challenge for cause that results in an unfair empaneled 
jury. Although the district court abused its discretion when it failed to strike for cause a prospective 
juror who demonstrated actual and inferable bias, the Court found that this error did not warrant 
reversal. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Sayedzada’s conviction. 
